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Abstract
In this paper we do two things: a) we dis-
cuss in general terms the task of incre-
mental reference resolution (IRR), in par-
ticular resolution of exophoric reference,
and specify metrics for measuring the per-
formance of dialogue system components
tackling this task, and b) we present a sim-
ple Bayesian filtering model of IRR that
performs reasonably well just using words
directly (no structure information and no
hand-coded semantics): it picks the right
referent out of 12 for around 50 % of real-
world dialogue utterances in our test cor-
pus. It is also able to learn to interpret not
only words but also hesitations, just as hu-
mans have shown to do in similar situa-
tions, namely as markers of references to
hard-to-describe entities.
1 Introduction
Like other tasks involved in language comprehen-
sion, reference resolution—that is, the linking of
natural language expressions to contextually given
entities—is performed incrementally by human
listeners. This was shown for example by Tanen-
haus et al. (1995) in a famous experiment where
addressees of utterances containing referring ex-
pressions made eye movements towards target ob-
jects very shortly after the end of the first word
that unambiguously specified the referent, even if
that wasn’t the final word of the phrase. In fact, as
has been shown in later experiments (Brennan and
Schober, 2001; Bailey and Ferreira, 2007; Arnold
et al., 2007), such disambiguating material doesn’t
even have to be lexical: under certain circum-
stances, a speaker’s hesitating already seems to be
understood as increasing the likelihood of subse-
quent reference to hard-to-describe entities.
Recently, efforts have begun to build dialogue
systems that make use of incremental processing
as well (Aist et al., 2006; Skantze and Schlangen,
2009). These efforts have so far focused on as-
pects other than resolution of references ((Stoness
et al., 2004) deals with the interaction of reference
and parsing). In this paper, we discuss in gen-
eral terms the task of incremental reference res-
olution (IRR) and specify metrics for evaluating
incremental components for this task. To make
the discussion more concrete, we also describe a
simple Bayesian filtering model of IRR in a do-
main with a small number of possible referents,
and show that it performs better wrt. our metrics
if given information about hesitations—thus pro-
viding computational support for the rationality of
including observables other than words into mod-
els of dialogue meaning.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows: We discuss the IRR task in Section 2, and
suitable evaluation metrics in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4 we describe and analyse the data for which
we present results with our Bayesian model for
IRR in Section 5.
2 Incremental Reference Resolution
To a first approximation, IRR can be modeled as
the ‘inverse’ as it were of the task of generating re-
ferring expressions (GRE; which is well-studied in
computational linguistics, see e. g. (Dale and Re-
iter, 1995)). Where in GRE words are added that
express features which reduce the size of the set
of possible distractors (with which the object that
the expression is intended to pick out can be con-
fused), in IRR words are encountered that express
features that reduce the size of the set of possible
referents. To give a concrete example, for the ex-
pression in (1-a), we could imagine that the logical
representation in (1-b) is built on a word-by-word
basis, and at each step the expression is checked
against the world model to see whether the refer-
ence has become unique.
(1) a. the red cross
b. ιx(red(x) ∧ cross(x))
To give an example, in a situation where there
are available for reference only one red cross, one
green circle, and two blue squares, we can say
that after “the red” the referent should have been
found; in a world with two red crosses, we would
need to wait for further restricting information
(e. g. “. . . on the left”).
This is one way to describe the task, then: a
component for incremental reference resolution
takes expressions as input in a word-by-word fash-
ion and delivers for each new input a set (possibly
a singleton set) as output which collects those dis-
course entities that are compatible with the expres-
sion up to that point. (This description is meant
to be neutral as to whether reference is exophoric,
i. e. directly to entities in the world, or anaphoric,
via previous mentions; we will mainly discuss the
former case, though.)
As we will see below, this does however
not translate directly into a usable metric for
evaluation. While it is easy to identify the
contributions of individual words in simple,
constructed expressions like (1-a), reference in
real conversations is often much more complex,
and is a collaborative process that isn’t confined
to single expressions (Clark and Schaefer, 1987):
referring is a pragmatic action that is not reducible
to denotation. In our corpus (see below), we often
find descriptions as in (2), where the speaker
continuously adds (rather vague) material, typi-
cally until the addressee signals that she identified
the item, or proposes a different way to describe it.
(2) Also das S Teil sieht so aus dass es ein
einzelnes . Teilchen hat . dann . vier am Stu¨ck
im rechten Winkel .. dazu nee . nee warte ..
dann noch ein einzelnes das guckt auf der an-
deren Seite raus.
well, the S piece looks so that it has a single . piece .
and then . four together in a 90 degree angle .. and also
. no .. wait .. and then a single piece that sticks out on
the other side.
While it’s difficult to say in the individual case
what the appropriate moment is to settle on a hy-
pothesis about the intended referent, and what the
“correct” time-course of the development of hy-
potheses is, it’s easy to say what we want to be true
in general: we want a referent to be found as early
as possible, with as little change of opinion as pos-
sible during the utterance.1 Hence a model that
finds the correct referent earlier and makes fewer
wrong decisions than a competing one will be con-
sidered better. The metrics we develop in the next
section spell out this idea.
3 Evaluation Metrics for IRR
In previous work, we have discussed metrics for
evaluating the performance of incremental speech
recognition (Baumann et al., 2009). There, our
metrics could rely on time-aligned gold-standard
information against which the incremental results
could be measured. For the reasons discussed
in the previous section, we do not assume that
we have such temporally-aligned information for
evaluating IRR. Our measures described here sim-
ply assume that there is one intention behind the
referring utterances (namely to identify a certain
entity), and that this intention is there from the be-
ginning of the utterance and stays constant.2 This
is not to be understood as the claim that it is rea-
sonable to expect an IRR component to pick out a
referent even if the only part of the utterance that
has already been processed for example is “now
take the”—it just facilitates the “earlier is better”
ranking discussed above.
We use two kinds of metrics for IRR: posi-
tional metrics, which measure when (which per-
centage into the utterance) a certain event happens,
and edit metrics which capture the “jumpiness”
of the decision process (how often the component
changes its mind during an utterance).
Figure 1 shows a constructed example that il-
1We leave open here what “as early as possible” means—
a well-trained model might be able to resolve a reference
before the speaker even deems that possible, and hence ap-
pear to do unnatural (or supernatural?) ‘mind reading’. Con-
versely, frequent changes of opinion might be something that
human listeners would exhibit as well (e. g. in their gaze di-
rection). We abstract away from these finer details in our
heuristic.
2Note that our metrics would also work for corpora where
the correct point-of-identification is annotated; this would
simply move the reference point from the beginning of the
utterance to that point. Gallo et al. (2007) describe an anno-
tation effort in a simpler domain where entities can easily be
described which would make such information available.
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Figure 1: Simple constructed example that illus-
trates the evaluation measures
lustrates these ideas. We assume that reference is
to an object that is internally represented by the
letter F. The example shows two models, no-sil
and sil (what exactly they are doesn’t matter for
now). The former model guesses that reference is
to object X already after the first word, and stays
with this opinion until it encounters the final word,
when it chooses F as most likely referent. (Why
the decision for the items sil is “-” will be ex-
plained below; here this can be read as “repetition
of previous decision”.) The other model changes
its mind more often, but also is correct for the first
time earlier and stays correct earlier. Our metrics
make this observation more precise:
• average fc (first correct): how deep into the ut-
terance do we make the first correct guess? (If the
decision component delivers n-best lists instead of
single guesses, “correct” means here and below “is
member of n-best list”.)
E. g., if the referent is recognised only after the
final word of the expression, the score for this met-
ric would be 1. In our example it is 2/5 for the
sil-model and 1 for the non-sil model.
• fc applicable: since the previous measure can
only be specified for cases where the correct refer-
ent has been found, we also specify for how many
utterances this is the case.
• average ff (first final): how deep into the utter-
ance do we make the correct guess and don’t sub-
sequently change our mind? This would be 4/5 for
the sil-model in our example and 1 for the no-sil-
model.
• ff applicable: again, the previous measure can
only be given where the final guess of the compo-
nent is correct, so we also need to specify how of-
ten this is the case. Note that whenever ff is appli-
cable, fc is applicable as well, so ff applicable≤fc
applicable.
• ed-utt (mean edits per utterance): an IRR mod-
ule may still change its mind even after it has al-
ready made a correct guess. This metric measures
how often the module changes its mind before it
comes back to the right guess (if at all). Since such
decision-revisions (edits) may be costly for later
modules, which possibly need to retract their own
hypotheses that they’ve built based on the output
of this module, ideally this number should be low.
In our example the number of edits between fc
and ff is 2 for the sil-model and 0 for the non-sil
model (because here fc and ff are at the same po-
sition).
• eo (edit overhead): ratio unnecessary edits / nec-
essary edits. (In the ideal case, there is exactly one
edit, from “no decision” to the correct guess.)
• correctness: how often the model guesses cor-
rectly. This is 3/5 for the sil-model in the example
and 1/5 for the non-sil-model.
• sil-correctness: how often the model guesses
correctly during hesitations. The correctness mea-
sure applied only to certain data-points; we use
this to investigate whether informing the model
about hesitations is helpful.
• adjusted error: some of our IRR models can re-
turn “undecided” as reply. The correctness mea-
sures defined above would punish this in the same
way as a wrong guess. The adjusted error measure
implements the idea that undecidedness is better
than a wrong guess, at least early in the utterance.
More precisely, it’s defined to be 0 if the guess is
correct, pos / pos
max
if the reply is “undecided”
(with pos denoting the position in the utterance),
and 1 if the guess is incorrect. That way uncer-
tainty is not punished in the beginning of the utter-
ance and counted like an error towards its end.
Note that these metrics characterise different as-
pects of the performance of a model. In practi-
cal cases, they may not be independent from each
other, and a system designer will have to decide
which one to optimize. If it is helpful to be in-
formed about a likely referent early, for example
to prepare a reaction, and is not terribly costly to
later have to revise hypotheses, then a low first cor-
rect may be the target. If hypothesis revisions are
costly, then a low edit overhead may be preferred
over a low first correct. (first final and ff applicable,
however, are parameters that are useful for global
optimisation.)
Figure 2: The Twelve Pentomino Pieces with their
canonical names (which were not known to the di-
alogue participants). The pieces used in the dia-
logues all had the same colour.
In the remaining sections, we describe a prob-
abilistic model of IRR that we have implemented,
and evaluate it in terms of these metrics. We begin




As the basis for training and testing of our model
we used data from three corpora of task-oriented
dialogue that differ in some details of the set-up,
but use the same task: an Instruction Giver (IG) in-
structs an Instruction Follower (IF) on which puz-
zle pieces (from the “Pentomino” game, see Fig-
ure 2) to pick up. In detail, the corpora were:
• The Pento Naming corpus described in (Siebert
and Schlangen, 2008). In this variant of the task,
IG records instructions for an absent IF; so these
aren’t fully interactive dialogues. The corpus con-
tained 270 utterances out of which we selected
those 143 that contained descriptions of puzzle
pieces (and not of their position on the game-
board).
• Selections from the FTT/PTT corpus described
in (Ferna´ndez et al., 2007), where IF and IG are
connected through an audio-only connection, and
in some dialogues a simplex / push-to-talk one.
We selected all utterances from IG that contained
references to puzzle pieces (286 altogether).
• The third part of our corpus was constructed
specifically for the experiments described here.
We set-up a Wizard of Oz experiment where users
were given the task to describe puzzle pieces for
the “dialogue system” to pick up. The system
(i. e. the wizard) had available a limited number
of utterances and hence could conduct only a lim-
ited form of dialogue. We collected 255 utter-
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Figure 3: Silence rate per referent and corpus
(WOz:black, PentoNaming:red, FTT:green)
All utterances were hand-transcribed and the
transcriptions were automatically aligned with the
speech data using the MAUS system (Schiel,
2004); this way, we could automatically identify
pauses during utterances and measure their length.
For some experiments (see below), pauses were
“re-ified” through the addition of silence pseudo-
words (one for each 333 ms of silence).
The resulting corpus is not fully balanced in
terms of available material for the various pieces
or contributions by sub-corpora.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
We were interested to see whether intra-utterance
silences (hesitations) could potentially be used as
an information source in our (more or less) real-
world data in the same way as was shown in
the much more controlled situations described in
the psycholinguistics literature mentioned above
in the introduction (Arnold et al., 2007). Fig-
ure 3 shows the mean ratio of within-utterance si-
lences per word for the different corpora and dif-
ferent referents. We can see that there are clear
differences between the pieces. For example, ref-
erences to the piece whose canonical name is X
contain very few or short hesitations, whereas ref-
erences to Y tend to contain many. We can also
see that the tendencies seem to be remarkably sim-
ilar between corpora, but with relatively stable off-
sets between them, PentoDescr having the longest,
PTT/FTT the shortest silences. We speculate that
this is the result of the differing degrees of inter-
activity (none in PentoDescr, restricted in WOz,
less restricted in PTT, free in FTT) which puts dif-
ferent pressures on speakers to avoid silences. To
balance our data with respect to this difference, we
performed some experiments with adjusted data
where silence lengths in PentoDescr were adjusted
by 0.7 and in PTT/FTT by 1.3. This brings the si-
lence rates in the corpora, if plotted in the style of
Figure 3, almost in congruence.
To test whether the differences in silence rate
between utterances referring to different pieces
are significant, we performed an ANOVA and
found a main effect of silence rate, F (11, 672) =
6.2102, p < 8.714−10. A post-hoc t-test reveals
that there are roughly two groups whose members
are not significantly different within-group, but are
across groups: I, L, U, W and X form one group
with relatively low silence rate, F, N, P, T, V, Y, and
Z another with relatively high silence rate. We will
see in the next section whether our model picked
up on these differences.
5 A Bayesian Filtering Model of IRR
To explore incremental reference resolution, and
as part of a larger incremental dialogue system we
are building, we implemented a probabilistic refer-
ence resolver that works in the pentomino domain.
At its base, the resolver has a Bayesian Filtering
model (see e. g. (Thrun et al., 2005)) that with each
new observation (word) computes a belief distri-
bution over the available objects (the twelve puz-
zle pieces); in a second step, a decision for a piece
(or a collection of pieces in the n-best case) is de-
rived from this distribution. This model is incre-
mental in a very natural and direct way: new input
increments are simply treated as new observations
that update the current belief state. Note that this
model does not start with any assumptions about
semantic word classes: whether an observed word
carries information about what is being referred to
will be learnt from data.
5.1 The Belief-Update Model
We use a Bayesian model which treats the in-
tended referent as a latent variable generating a
sequence of observations (w1:n is the sequence of
words w1, w2, . . . , wn):
P (r|w1:n) = α ∗ P (wn|r, w1:n−1) ∗ P (r|w1:n−1)
where
• P (wn|r, w1:n−1) is the likelihood of the new
observation (see below for how we approximate
that); and
• the prior P (r|w1:n−1) at step n is the posterior
of the previous step. Before the first observation is
made (i. e., the first word is seen), the prior is sim-
ply a distribution over the possible referents, P (r).
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Figure 4: Example of Belief Distribution after Ob-
servation
In our experiment, we set this to a uniform distri-
bution, but if there is prior information from other
sources (e. g., because the dialogue state makes
certain pieces more salient), this can be reflected.
• α is a normalising constant, ensuring that the re-
sult is indeed a probability distribution.
The output of the model is a distribution of be-
lief over the 12 available entities, as shown in Fig-
ure 4. Figure 5 shows in a 3D plot the devel-
opment of the belief state (pieces from front to
back, strength of belief as height of the peaks) over
the course of a whole utterance (with observations
from left to right).
5.2 The Decision Step
We implemented several ways to derive a decision
for a referent from such a distribution:
i) In the arg max approach, at each state the ref-
erent with the highest posterior probability is cho-
sen. For Figure 4, that would be F (and hence,
a wrong decision). As Figure 5 shows (and the
example is quite representative for the model be-
haviour), there often are various local maxima
over the course of an utterance, and hence a model
that takes as its decision always the maximum can
be expected to perform many edits.
ii) In the adaptive threshold approach, we start
with a default decision for a special 13th class,
“undecided”, and a new decision is only made if
the maximal value at the current step is above a
certain threshold, where this threshold is reset ev-
ery time this condition is met. In other words, this
draws a plane into the belief space and only makes
a new decision when a peak rises above this plane
and hence above the previous peak. In effect, this
approach favours strong convictions and reduces
utterance #: 230 intended referent:  N
 hast eine lange ule mit drei teilen <sil−0> <sil−1> und eine kurze mit zwei








Figure 5: Belief Update over Course of Utterance
the “jitter” in the decision making.
In our example from Figure 4, this would mean
that the maximum, F, would only be the decision
if its value was higher than the threshold and there
was no previous guess that was even higher.
iii) The final model implements a threshold n-
best approach, where not just a single piece is se-
lected but all pieces that are above a certain thresh-
old. Assuming that the threshold is 0.1 for exam-
ple this would select F, I, N, Y, and Z—and hence
would include the correct reference in Figure 4.
5.3 Implementation
To learn and query the observation likelihoods
P (wn|r, w1:n−1), we used referent-specific lan-
guage models. More precisely, we computed the
likelihood as P (r, w1:n)/P (r, w1:n−1) (definition
conditional probability), and approximated the
joint probabilities of referent and word sequence
via n-grams with specialised words. E. g., an ut-
terance like “take the long, narrow piece” refer-
ring to piece I (or tested for reference to this piece)
would be rewritten as “take I the I long I narrow I
piece I” and presented to the n-gram learner / in-
ference component. (Both taken from the SRI LM
package, (Stolcke, 2002).)
During evaluation of the models, the test utter-
ances are fed word-by-word to the model and the
decision is evaluated against the known intended
referent. Since we were interested in testing
whether disfluencies contained information that
would be learned, for one variant of the system
we also fed pseudo-words for silences and hesi-
tation markers like uhm, numbered by their posi-
tion (i. e., “take the ..” becomes “take the sil-1 sil-
2”), to both learning and inference for the silence-
sensitive variant; the silence-ignorant variant sim-
ply repeats the previous decision at such points
and does not update its belief state; this way, it
is guaranteed that both variants generate the same
number of decisions and can be compared directly.
(Cf. the dashes in the “no-sil-model” in Figure 1
above: those are points where no real computation
is made in the no-sil case.)
5.4 Experiments
All experiments were performed with 10-fold
cross-validation. We always ran both versions, the
one that showed silences to the model and the one
that didn’t. We tested various combinations of lan-
guage model parameters and deciders, of which
the best-performing ones are discussed in the next
section.
5.5 Results
Table 1 shows the results for the different deci-
sion methods and for models where silences are
included as observations and where they aren’t,
and, as a baseline, the result for a resolver that
makes a random decision after each observation.
As we can see, the different decision methods
have different characteristics wrt. individual mea-
sures. The threshold n-best approach performs
best across the board—but of course has a slightly
easier job since it does not need to make unam-
biguous decisions. We will look into the develop-
ment of the n-best lists in a second, but for now
we note that this model is for almost all utterances
correct at least once (97 % fc applicable) and if
so, typically very early (after 30 % of the utter-
ance). In over half of the cases (54.68 %), the fi-
nal decision is correct (i. e. is an n-best list that
contains the correct referent), and similarly for a
good third of all silence observations. Interest-
ingly, silence-correctness is decidedly higher for
the silence model (which does actually make new
decisions during silences and hence based on the
information that the speaker is hesitating) than for
the non-sil model (which at these places only re-
peats the previously made decision). The model
performs significantly bettern than a baseline that
randomly selects n-best lists of the same size (see
rnd-nb in Table 1).
As can be expected, the adaptive threshold ap-
proach is more stable with its decisions, as wit-
nessed by the low edit overhead. The fact that it
changes its decision not as often has an impact on
the other measures, though: in more cases, the
model is correct not even once (fc applicable is
n-best rnd-nb adapt max random
Measure / Model w/ h w/o h w/ h w/ h w/o h w/ h w/o h w/ h
fc applicable 97.22 % 95.03 % 85.38 % 63.15 % 66.67 % 86.55 % 82.89 % 59.94 %
average fc 30.43 % 33.73 % 29.61 % 53.87 % 55.25 % 46.55 % 49.31 % 42.60 %
ff applicable 54.68 % 54.24 % 17.54 % 48.68 % 53.07 % 39.77 % 40.64 % 9.65 %
average ff 87.74 % 85.01 % 97.08 % 71.24 % 70.89 % 96.08 % 94.28 % 98.44 %
edit overhead 93.49 % 90.65 % 96.65 % 69.61 % 67.66 % 92.57 % 89.44 % 93.16 %
correctness 37.81 % 36.81 % 23.37 % 23.01 % 26.61 % 17.83 % 20.23 % 7.83 %
sil-correctness 36.60 % 31.09 % 26.39 % 18.71 % 22.58 % 13.67 % 19.34 % 8.63 %
adjusted error 60.07 % 56.96 % 76.63 % 76.29 % 70.90 % 82.17 % 79.42 % 92.16 %
Table 1: Results for different decision methods (n-best, adaptive, max arg and random) and for models
with and without silence-observations (w/ h and w/o h, respectively)
lower than for the other two models). But it is
still correct with almost half of its final decisions,
and these come even earlier than for the n-best
model. Silence information does not seem to help
this model; this suggests that the information pro-
vided by knowledge about the fact that the speaker
hesitates is too subtle to push through the thresh-
old in order to change decisions.
The arg max approach fares worst. Since nei-
ther the relative strength of the strongest belief (as
compared to that in the competing pieces) nor the
global strength (have I been more convinced be-
fore?) is taken into account, the model changes
its mind too often, as evidenced by the edit over-
head, and does not settle on the correct referent of-
ten (and if, then late). Again, silence information
does not seem to be helpful for this model.
As a more detailed look at what happens dur-
ing silence sequences, Figure 6 plots the average
change in probability from onset of silence to a
point at 1333 ms of silence. (Recall that the un-
derlying Bayesian model is the same for all mod-
els evaluated above, they differ only in how they
derive a decision.) We can see that the gains and
losses are roughly as expected from the analysis of
the corpora: pieces like L and P become more ex-
pected after a silence of that length, pieces like X
less. So the model does indeed seem to learn that
hesitations systematically occur together with cer-
tain pieces. (The reader can convince herself with
the help of Figure 2 that these shapes are indeed
comparatively hard-to-describe; but the interesting
point here is that this categorisation does not have
to be brought to the model but rather is discovered
by it.)
Finally, a look at the distribution and the sizes of
the n-best groupings: the most frequent decision is








Figure 6: Average change in probability from on-
set of silence to 1333 ms into silence
“undecided” (474 times), followed by the group-
ings F N, N Y, and N Y P (343, 342 and 196, re-
spectively). Here again we find groupings that re-
flect the differences w.r.t. hesitation rate. The av-
erage size of the n-best lists is 2.58 (sd = 1.4).
6 Conclusions and Further Work
We discussed the task of incremental reference
resolution (IRR), in particular with respect to ex-
ophoric reference. From a theoretical perspective,
it might seem easy to specify what the ideal be-
haviour of an IRR component should be, namely
to always produce the set of entities (the exten-
sion) that is compatible with the part of the ex-
pression seen so far. In practice, however, this is
difficult to annotate, for both practical reasons as
well as theoretical (referring is a pragmatic activ-
ity that is not reducible to denotation). The met-
rics we defined for evaluation of IRR components
account for this in that they do not require a gold
standard annotation that fixes the dynamics of the
resolution process; they simply make it possible
to quantify the assumption that “early and with
strong convictions” is best.
We then presented our probabilistic model of
IRR that works directly on word observations
without any further processing (POS tagging,
parsing). It achieves a reasonable success (as mea-
sured with our metrics); for example, in over half
of the cases, the final guess of the model is correct,
and comes before the utterance is over. As an ad-
ditional interesting feature, the model is able to in-
terpret hesitations (silences lifted to pseudo-word
status) in a way shown before only in controlled
psycholinguistic experiments, namely as making
reference to hard-to-describe pieces more likely.3
In future work, we want to explore the model’s
performance on ASR output. It is not clear a
priori that this would degrade performance much,
as it can be expected that the learning components
are quite robust against noise. Connected to
this, we want to explore more complex statis-
tical models, e. g. a hierarchical model where
one level generates parts of the utterance (e. g.
non-referential parts and referential parts) and the
second the actual words. We also want to test how
this approach scales up to worlds with a larger
number of possible referents, where consequently
approximation methods like particle filtering have
to be used. Finally, we will test how the module
contributes to a working dialogue system, where
further decisions (e. g. for clarification requests)
can be built on its output.
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